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Abstract
Operating overheads are widespread and lead to concentrated bursts of
activity. To transfer resources between active and idle spells, agents demand
ﬁnancial assets. Futures contracts and lotteries are unsuitable, as they have
substantial overheads of their own. We show that money – under eﬃcient
monetary policy – is a liquid asset that leads to eﬃcient allocations. Under all
other policies, agents follow ineﬃcient “money cycle” patterns of saving, activ-
ity, and inactivity. Agents spend their money too quickly – a “hot potato eﬀect
of inﬂation”. We show that inﬂation can stimulate ineﬃciently high aggregate
output.
1 Introduction
Operating overheads are widespread. Workers prepare for work by dressing profes-
sionally, travelling to work – often in peak traﬃc, re-familiarising themselves with
their work plans (leaving family plans on hold), and checking in with colleagues. In
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manufacturing, signiﬁcant engineering eﬀort is applied to replace inventories with
“just-in-time” production. But, when overheads can not be engineered away, activ-
ities are concentrated into bursts and batches. For example, oil tankers have high
operating costs leading to large volumes being transported at a time, retailers restock
with large deliveries, dry cleaners concentrate into batches due to the ﬁxed cost of
heating the drums, and income tax is evaluated every year. These bursts lead to
demand for ﬁnancial assets: holding large inventories typically involves trade credit,
consignment, or futures contracts, and workers’ rosters might be chosen by lottery.
However, these assets all involve substantial overheads of their own. All of these as-
sets involve the possibility of default, which is minimised with costly credit checks,
collateral, and intermediation. Lotteries are particularly cumbersome: (i) to prevent
default, money or some collateral would have to be posted before the winner is an-
nounced, and (ii) lotteries have a divisibility problem; for example ﬁve people are
required if they would all like a 60% chance to work 100 hours (or win $100). How-
ever, there is one asset with very little overhead, namely money. Instead of buying
from suppliers using trade credit, buyers could use money saved from previous sales
to pay on delivery. Instead of random shift rosters, workers might decide to produce
more on work days and save money to fund days oﬀ. Money is divisible, recognisable,
and storable, giving it minimal transaction costs. Does this mean money is useful for
overcoming overheads in productive activities?
To answer this question, we study a simple economy with a single productive
activity. Output can be produced from labour, where an overhead of labour is re-
quired to begin production, and there is diminishing marginal productivity. Output
is non-storable, and must be traded or consumed immediately. We compare the so-
cial planner’s preferred allocations with equilibrium allocations in which the agents
can hold and trade money.
Focusing our attention on a utilitarian social planner, we ﬁnd that he prefers to
allocate equal consumption to all agents. He prefers to make all work shifts the same
length, but is indiﬀerent between all feasible work shift allocations. This generalises
the results by Rogerson (1988) and Prescott, Rogerson and Wallenius (2009). The
key step is to show that the social planner’s problem with overheads is equivalent to
a convexiﬁed social planner’s problem in which the production technology no longer
has any overheads.
Can money achieve utilitarian-optimal allocations? We ﬁrst study monetary equi-
libria when money is supplied with lump-sum taxation to support deﬂation at the
rate of time preference, i.e. the Friedman rule. We ﬁnd that all equilibria involve a
“working class” and possibly a “leisure class” of agents. Working class agents con-
sume the same amount every period, produce more than they consume in the long
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run, and may sometimes take a vacation. Members of the leisure class consume more
than the working class and never work. Equilibria in which the leisure class is absent
are utilitarian-optimal.
However, money is not perfectly frictionless, and is rarely supplied at the Fried-
man rule. How does money perform away from socially optimal monetary policy? We
develop a theory that characterises all stationary symmetric monetary equilibria. We
ﬁnd that only equilibria approximating the utilitarian-optimal working class equilib-
ria exist. In these equilibria, all agents proceed through a “money cycle” pattern of
ﬁnite length of saving, production, and consumption. All aggregates are stationary
– agents are at diﬀerent phases of their cycle at any given moment. There is a “hot
potato eﬀect of inﬂation” which induces agents to spend their money too quickly on
consumption, and hence render these money cycle equilibria ineﬃcient.
We highlight some surprising features of our model, by refuting four conjectures
that we argue are natural in the context of the monetary literature. First, we show
that inﬂation need not depress economic activity, even in a model of complete infor-
mation. Second, we show that even when consumption and leisure are normal goods,
wealthier agents do not consume more and work less. Third, we show that Baumol-
Tobin style Ss cycles are not the only possible money cycle structure. Finally, we
show that symmetric equilibria need not exist, and two money cycles can co-exist in
asymmetric equilibria.
Our work is related to three strands of literature. One literature is about the
optimal allocation of labour when there are large setup costs. In the Rogerson (1988)
model, labour is indivisible. He found that lotteries are eﬃcient for convexifying
the indivisibility. In Prescott et al. (2009), households choose their work intensity
in continuous time when facing a non-concave production function. In this setting,
equilibria with complete markets are utilitarian-optimal. Our work characterises all
utilitarian-optimal allocations, shows that eﬃcient monetary policy is equivalent to
complete markets, and characterises equilibria under realistic monetary frictions.
Another literature is about ﬁnancial frictions in converting ﬁnancial assets into
money. The only asset in our model is money, and this literature suggests a path
forward for introducing other assets. Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956) study a partial
equilibrium model of money, when there is a ﬁxed cost of liquidating an asset with
high return. They show that an Ss policy is optimal (unlike in our setting). Alvarez,
Atkeson and Kehoe (2002) also think about a ﬁxed cost of liquidating ﬁnancial assets,
but assume that agents can not hold money across periods. Kaplan and Violante
(2014) numerically explore a model with a ﬁxed cost of liquidating high-return assets,
and calculate the equilibrium response to ﬁscal stimulus payments. Their equilibrium
calculations are complicated, but have a similar nature to our money cycle equilibria.
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Their agents proceed through Ss cycles involving a single liquidation, but we expect
more complicated patterns akin to our money cycles would arise with an increasing
marginal cost of liquidation.
Finally, our work is related to several monetary theories based on double-coincidence
frictions in the tradition of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989). Faig (2008) and Menzio, Shi
and Sun (2013) explore the use of money and lotteries to smooth out an overhead,
namely sellers forego the opportunity to be buyers. In Faig (2008), sellers can only
serve one buyer per period, so in equilibrium, workers never save for more than one
vacation. Menzio et al. (2013) introduce ﬁrms to accommodate multilateral matching,
so that workers save for several vacation periods. This leads the money distribution
to be non-degenerate, and allows them to study how inﬂation aﬀects people holding
diﬀerent amounts of money. They ﬁnd that wealthier agents consume more. In con-
trast, we ﬁnd that the poorest agents consume the most and that the wealth eﬀect
is non-monotonic.
The micro-founded monetary literature also includes several papers that explore
whether inﬂation can stimulate economic activity. Ennis (2009) ﬁnds that inﬂation
can increase search activity, but does not investigate the eﬀect on productive activi-
ties; he also ﬁnds that agents front-load consumption. Nosal (2011) studies a stylised
model in which buyers are sent to the back of the queue after trading, which leads to
a perverse incentive to avoid trade. He ﬁnds that inﬂation is welfare-improving and
increases aggregate output because the hot-potato eﬀect oﬀsets the trade-avoidance
incentive. Other papers in this literature include Berentsen, Camera and Waller
(2005) and Liu, Wang and Wright (2011).
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 introduces a model in which agents
have access to ﬁat money and incur overheads in economic activity. Section 3 char-
acterises eﬃcient allocations, with particular attention to utilitarian-optimal alloca-
tions. We then characterise the allocations that may arise under eﬃcient monetary
policy in Section 4. This monetary policy is implausible, so in Section 5 we charac-
terise the equilibria that arise under ineﬃcient monetary policy. We use this theory
to address several natural conjectures that arise in various literatures in Section 6.
Section 7 reﬂects on the contribution of the paper. Section A.1 discusses a related
model in which agents trade Lucas trees rather than money. Section A.2 addresses
some diﬃculties in calculating money cycle equilibria.
2 Environment
We construct a stationary general equilibrium model in inﬁnite discrete time where
agents discount at rate . There is a continuum of agents i 2 [0; 1] who may produce
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any quantity qt  0 of a homogeneous consumption good at cost c (qt) in period t.
We assume that the production cost c (q) is strictly increasing, convex on (0;1), and
diﬀerentiable on (0;1), but allow for a discontinuity at q = 0 which represents a
ﬁxed cost. Not producing anything is free, i.e. c (0) = 0. Agents receive utility u (xt)
from consuming xt  0 units of this good. We assume that u is strictly increas-
ing, diﬀerentiable, concave, and satisﬁes the Inada conditions limx!0+ u0(x) = 1;
limx!0+ u(x) =  1:
Throughout the paper, we assume that the consumption good is non-storable1.
However, agents have access to ﬁat money, which they can trade for goods without
incurring any ﬁxed costs.2 If an agent produces more than he consumes, he may sell
the surplus for money on a spot market at the price pt. Conversely, an agent can
consume more than he produces buy trading at the same price pt. Since other types
of assets such as bonds, loans, and stocks involve transaction costs, agents would use
money to smooth those costs out as well. For simplicity, we focus on just one ﬁxed
cost – in the production cost function – by excluding all non-monetary assets. Let
Mt be the aggregate stock of money in nominal terms at the beginning of period t.
We assume that it evolves over time depending on a lump sum transfer Tt issued by
the government to all agents before starting to trade goods so that Mt+1 = Mt + Tt.
We write 1 + t+1 = Mt+1/Mt, where  is the money growth rate. Throughout the
analysis, we take the government’s monetary policy as exogenous so that Mt, t and
Tt are exogenous variables.
If an agent holds mt units of money at time t, his optimal choices satisfy the
following Bellman equation
~Vt (m) = max
q2R+; x2R+;m02R+
u (x)  c (q) +  ~Vt+1 (m0)
s.t. ptxt +mt+1 = ptqt +mt + Tt:
(1)
We focus on stationary equilibria under a stationary monetary policy, so that the
real transfer is stationary with T = Tt/pt and inﬂation is stationary with  = t.
Note that T – unlike Tt – is endogenous because it is deﬁned in terms of prices which
are endogenous. Let Zt = Mt/pt be the real value of the money stock. In a stationary
equilibrium, the money growth rate Mt+1/Mt = 1 +  coincides with the inﬂation
rate pt+1/pt. SinceMt+Tt = (1 + )Mt, or in real terms, Zt+T = (1 + )Zt, the real
1 Non-monetary equilibria with storable goods are equivalent to monetary equilibria with zero
inﬂation. Under deﬂation, agents would choose to hold money rather than store goods.
2 In Section A.1, we explore how our analysis would change if agents could trade Lucas trees
instead of money. We focus on money in the body of the paper because money has very small
overheads.
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money stock is stationary and can be expressed as Z = T/. When we replace the
nominal balances mt with real balances zt = mt/pt, the problem becomes stationary:
V (z) = max
q2R+;x2R+;z02R+
u (x)  c (q) + V (z0)
s.t. x+ (1 + ) z0 = q + z + T:
(2)
We write the optimal production quantity as q (z) and the optimal consumption
policy as x (z). The distribution of real money holdings is F . A symmetric stationary
equilibrium in this environment is a tuple
[x (z) ; q (z) ; F (z) ; T ]
such that
• the policies q (z) and x (z) solve the stationary problem (2) given T ;
• goods and money markets clear so that supply equals demand:Z
q (z) dF (z) =
Z
x (z) dF (z) and T

=
Z
z dF (z) ;
• the distribution of money holdings is stationary:
F (z0) =
Z
I f [q (z)  x (z) + z + T ]/ (1 + )  z0g dF (z)
which means that the measure of agents holding less than or equal to z0 real
balances of money at the beginning of the next period has to equal the measure
that saved z0 or less by working, consuming, and getting lump sum transfers.
3 Eﬃcient Allocations
We characterise the eﬃcient allocations of consumption and production when there
are ﬁxed costs of production. In this section, we focus most of our attention on
a utilitarian social planner that puts equal welfare weight on all agents. We ﬁnd
that this planner allocates each agent a mix of “full-time” shifts and vacations. He
allocates each agent the same consumption, but does not attempt to allocate shifts
evenly – he is indiﬀerent among all feasible shift allocations.
Our proof technique is to introduce a second production cost function, namely the
convex hull of the economy’s production cost (see Figure 1). We ﬁnd that a general
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Figure 1: The convex hull of the cost function
class of social planners’ values are the same, regardless of which production cost
function he faces. We then solve the utilitarian social planner’s convexiﬁed problem
to characterise utilitarian-optimal allocations.
The social planner prioritises the utility of agent i 2 [0; 1] according to a Negishi
weight, i. The social planner calculates social welfare as
W () = max
fxit;qitg
Z
[0;1]
i
1X
t=0
t[u(xit)  c(qit)]di (3)
s.t.
Z
[0;1]
[xit   qit]di = 0 for all t. (4)
Our approach is to study an equivalent social planner’s problem that is easier to
solve. We will establish that the (non-convex) production cost function, c() has a
range of redundant output levels, (0; q) that the social planner would never wish to
allocate to any worker. We reduce the costs of these redundant outputs as far as we
can while still keeping them redundant, i.e. until the planner is indiﬀerent between
allocating them to some workers or not. The resulting production cost function is
the convex hull, denoted c(), and is depicted in Figure 1. Formally speaking, it is
the upper envelope of all aﬃne functions that lie below c(). The convex hull is linear
on (0; q), and coincides with the original cost function elsewhere.3
3 Note that when c() has constant marginal cost, it never intersects its convex hull c() above
q = 0. We focus on economies in which the marginal cost increases to inﬁnity.
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The ﬁrst part of Theorem 1 veriﬁes that indeed, the social planner has the same
value under either production cost function, precisely because they only diﬀer on
redundant choices (0; q). The convexiﬁed problem is simpler, because there is no
longer any need to treat agents diﬀerently to avoid the ineﬃcient output levels (0; q).
Therefore, the remaining parts of the theorem focus on utilitarian social welfare that
allocates equal weight to each agent. Part (ii) ﬁnds that autarky is a utilitarian-
optimal allocation, where agents consume and produce the x that solves
u0(x) = c0(x): (5)
But this is not the only utilitarian-optimal allocation. The linear section of c() also
leads uneven workloads to be utilitarian-optimal.
Part (iii) uses this characterisation of the convexiﬁed problem to understand the
original social planner’s problem. While the autarky allocation is optimal in the con-
vexiﬁed problem, we know that it is ineﬃcient in the original problem. Nevertheless,
since the social welfare in both problems is equal, it follows that there must be
some way to rearrange production to achieve the same level of welfare in the original
problem.
Part (iv) calculates utilitarian welfare by using the autarky allocation.
Theorem 1. (i) The social planner’s problem and the convexiﬁed social planner’s
problem coincide, i.e. W () = W () for all .
For the remaining parts, suppose x  q and  = 1, i.e. i = 1 for all i.
(ii) All solutions to the convexiﬁed social planner’s problem involve xit = x and
qit 2 [0; q] for almost all (i; t).
(iii) All solutions to the social planner’s problem involve xit = x and qit 2 f0; qg
for almost all (i; t).
(iv) W (1) = W (1) = [u(x)  c(x)]/(1  ).
Proof. (i) We ﬁrst note that W ()  W (), because c(q)  c(q) for all q, i.e. the
convexiﬁed problem is a relaxation of the original problem.
To show that W ()  W (), we ﬁrst simplify both functions. The additively
separable nature of the social planner’s problem means that it can be reformu-
lated recursively as
W () = max
fxi;qig
Z
[0;1]
i[u(xi)  c(qi)]di+ W () (6)
s.t.
Z
[0;1]
[xi   qi]di = 0: (7)
8
This means the social planner’s problem is essentially a static problem (un-
like the agent’s problem in the monetary economy). A similar reformulation is
possible for the convexiﬁed social planner’s problem.
To show thatW ()  W (), we show that any solution fxi ; qi g to the later can
be transformed into a solution of the former without any loss of social welfare.
Now, let A = fi : qi 2 (0; q)g be the set of agents who work strictly between 0
and q hours. We will exploit the linearity of the convexiﬁed cost function c()
on [0; q] to rearrange these workers’ hours to the boundary, f0; qg, where c()
and c() coincide. If the (Lebesgue) measure of these agents (A) is zero, then
no rearrangement is necessary. Suppose then that (A) > 0. In this case, i
must be the same for almost all workers in A. (Otherwise, the social planner
would strictly prefer to reallocate work from workers with high Negishi weights
to those with low Negishi weights, violating the optimality of fxi ; qi g.) Since i
is the same number for almost all agents in A, the social planner is indiﬀerent
about reallocating work to the boundaries, 0 and q. Therefore, this reallocation
has the same value in both social planner problems, and impliesW ()  W ().
(ii) Now suppose that fxi ; qi g is a solution to the convexiﬁed problem in which
i = 1 for all i. We consider two possible reallocations the social planner might
make: (a) instructing agent i to give  of his consumption up in favour of agent
j, and (b) instructing agent i to change his production and consumption by
the same amount, . Since these reallocations involving only a ﬁnite number of
agents, they do not aﬀect social welfare. However, the per-agent objectives
iu(x

i   ) + ju(xj + )
i[u(x

i + )  c(qi + )]
are maximised by  = 0 for almost all agents (or pairs of agents in the ﬁrst
case). Since the Negishi weights are equal, we obtain the ﬁrst-order conditions,
u0(xi ) = u
0(xj)
u0(xi ) = c
0(qi ) if qi > 0.
The ﬁrst equality implies that almost all agents consume the same amount,
which we denote x. The second equality implies that either almost all produce
the same amount q > q or almost all agents produce in the range [0; q]. The
former case is impossible, as the resource constraint would imply x = q = x,
violating the condition that x < q. Therefore, u0(x) = c0(q), which implies
x = x.
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Therefore, almost all agents consume x and produce in [0; q] in solutions to
the convexiﬁed social planners problem when x < q and all agents are equally
weighted.
(iii) This follows from parts (i) and (ii).
(iv) Part (ii) found the autarky allocation involving consumption and production
of x is utilitarian-optimal in the convexiﬁed problem. Therefore, utilitarian
welfare is
W (1) = W (1) =
Z
[0;1]
u(x)  c(x)
1   di =
u(x)  c(x)
1   : (8)
Prescott et al. (2009, Sections 2 and 3) study the social planner’s problem in
a related environment with a non-concave production function. Our analysis is a
somewhat more complicated, because we accommodate agents that discount that
future and because we accommodate non-utilitarian social planners. Apart from that,
they assume time is continuous, where each instant is interpreted as one week, and
that agents have ﬁnite lifetimes. The main conclusions are the same: the utilitarian
social planner has all agents consume the same amount at all times, and work the
same hours as each other (during work weeks). Their paper in turn builds on the work
of Rogerson (1988), in which workers live for one period and make a single indivisible
labour choice. That paper found that lotteries are eﬃcient. Lotteries would also be
utilitarian-optimal in our economy and in the economy of Prescott et al. (2009), if
they were available.
4 Eﬃcient Saving with Money
Real-world market institutions involve a wide range of frictions that leaves a gap
between eﬃcient and equilibrium allocations. As discussed in the introduction, we
focus on monetary institutions, rather than credit, lotteries, bonds, or capital, which
involve substantial ﬁxed costs. This section argues that an idealised form of monetary
institutions (with an unrealistic monetary policy) leads to utilitarian-optimal allo-
cations. This result will help us understand the frictions of more realistic monetary
policies in the next section.
The previous section established that utilitarian-optimal allocations involve con-
stant consumption, a constant work shift length, and vacations. This means agents
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need a way to save for vacations. Money is one such institution. Monetary policy –
speciﬁcally, the return of holding money (1 + ) – determines the agent’s incentive
to save and smooth out consumption. We need a policy that makes the agent reject
deviating from stationary consumption by saving an extra unit of money. This is the
case when the return of holding money equals the discount rate, i.e. the Friedman
rule, 1 +  = . We ﬁnd that a large class of equilibria are possible, but argue that
only the utilitarian-optimal equilibria are robust.
Our study of the agent’s problem mirrors that of the social planner’s problem in
the previous section. In Theorem 2, we establish that the agent’s value of holding
money is the same, regardless of whether the agent faces production cost c() or
the convexiﬁed cost function c(). That allows us to show that agents either take
vacations or work a full shift, when they are tight on money (we call them “working
class”), or they never work and consume their return on savings (we call these agents
“leisure class”). We will argue below that only equilibria without any leisure class
are robust. Part (iv) establishes that these robust equilibria are utilitarian-optimal.
Theorem 2. Let V be the agent’s convexiﬁed value function. Suppose that x  q.
For every real value of transfers T at the Friedman rule, there is a cut-oﬀ z =
(x   T )/(1  ) such that:
(i) The agent’s actual and convexiﬁed value functions coincide, with
V (z) = V (z) =
u(x)  c(x)
1   + c
0(q)(z   Z) (9)
for all z 2 [0; z], where Z = T/,
(ii) agents with z < z (“working class”) consume x every period, and only ever
produce 0 or q,
(iii) agents with z > z (“leisure class”) consume z(1   )   T > x every period
and never work, and
(iv) all symmetric stationary equilibria [x(); q(); F (); T ] without any leisure class
are utilitarian-optimal, i.e.Z
V (z) dF (z) = W (1) =
u(x)  c(x)
1   :
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Proof. (i) We guess-and-verify that V as deﬁned in (9) is a ﬁxed-point of the
agent’s convexiﬁed problem’s Bellman operator,
(V )(z) = max
x;q
u(x)  c(q) + V

z + q + T   x
1 + 

s.t. x  z + q + T:
Technically speaking, we only claim this is the formula for V on a subset of its
domain. If the agent has a large amount of savings (above x/(1   ) + Z),
he can aﬀord to buy x and pay the lump-sum tax  T from the return and
never work again; in this case, the marginal value of z has curvature, so the
linear formula overestimates V . Therefore, it suﬃces to check that the relevant
portion of V is unchanged by the Bellman operator, despite V (z) being too
large for large z. Applying the Bellman operator to V under the Friedman rule
1 +  =  gives
( V )(z) = max
x;q
u(x)  c(q) + c0(q)(z + q + T   x  Z) + u(x
)  c(x)
1  
s.t. x  z + q + T:
First-order conditions give x = x and the agent being indiﬀerent between
choosing any feasible q 2 [0; q].4 For simplicity, we choose q = x = x:
( V )(z) = u(x)  c(x) + c0(q)(z + T   Z) + u(x
)  c(x)
1  
=
u(x)  c(x)
1   + c
0(q)(z   Z)
= V (z):
Thus, we have veriﬁed the formula (9) for V , and that there exists an optimal
policy involving q(z) 2 f0; qg for all z.
We now establish that V = V . Since V is the value of a relaxed problem, we
know that V (z)  V (z) for all z. Since an optimal solution of the relaxed
problem is feasible in the original problem, we know that V (z)  V (z). We
conclude that V = V .
(ii) First, we claim that only q 2 f0; qg can be optimal choices. Suppose for the
sake of contradiction, that q^ 2 (0; q) were optimal at z^ < z. This would imply
c(q^) > c(q^), and hence V (z^) > V (z^), which violates (i).
4 It follows from x  q that the agent chooses q  q.
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Second, the optimal consumption choice in both problems is the same, because
in both cases, the ﬁrst-order conditions imply u0(x) = c0(q):
(iii) If z  z, the agent may wish to choose z0 > z, so (9) does not apply. Never-
theless, the Euler equation u0(x) = /(1+ )u0(x0) = u0(x0) holds, so the agent
chooses constant consumption. (See Lemma 1 below.) The agent can aﬀord to
consume at least  z+T = x, so the marginal utility of consumption u0(x)
is lower than the marginal cost of working, c0(q), so this agent never works. The
agent never transitions to become working class – otherwise, his consumption
would drop to x, violating the Euler equation.
(iv) Follows from (9).
It is well-known that the Friedman rule monetary policy often has a large class
of equilibria that do not survive when the monetary policy is changed slightly. We
argue that equilibria involving a leisure class are exotic in this sense. The corollary
below establishes that leisure class equilibria do exist at the Friedman rule, but we
establish in the next section that they do not exist for any other monetary policy.
This means only utilitarian-optimal equilibria have any counterpart away from the
Friedman rule.
The simplest leisure class equilibrium involves the leisure class extracting all the
surplus from the working class. In this “exploitation” equilibrium, the working class
agents work every day, while the leisure class agents never work and live oﬀ the
return from holding money.
Corollary 4.1. If x  q, then for any measure of working class agents, e 2
[x/q; 1), there exists an (“exploitation”) equilibrium with the following properties:
(i) Lump-sum transfers are T =  (q   x).
(ii) Working class agents never take vacations and hold z = 0. (They work q and
consume x every period, as before.)
(iii) Leisure class agents consume xl = qe/(1   e) every period and hold z = (xl  
T )/. (They never work, as before.)
Proof. It is straightforward to verify that under the proposed consumption and work
policies, the conjectured distribution of money holdings is stationary.
By Theorem 2 part (ii), the agents holding money z = 0 are working class, and
prefer to consume x every period and to work q 2 f0; qg. Since only q = q is feasible
at z = 0, we conclude the working class choose to work every period.
13
When the size of the working class e is suﬃciently large, the agents holding
z = (xl   T )/ are above the leisure class cut-oﬀ of Theorem 2 part (iii). According
to the theorem, these agents prefer to consume xl every period and never work.
The quantity xl was chosen so that the goods market clears. Walras’ law then
implies that the money market also clears.
Prescott et al. (2009) also consider equilibria that implement eﬃcient allocations.
They study an Arrow-Debreu economy in which agents can eﬀectively borrow and
save at the frictionless interest rate. In the monetary economy we study, agents
can not hold negative money balances, and are therefore credit constrained. This
means that every utilitarian-optimal monetary equilibrium at the Friedman rule is
an equilibrium in their economy, but not vice versa. Agents in their economy are
only endowed with time (and not money), so no leisure class equilibrium can arise.
5 Ineﬃcient Money Cycles
The previous section studied an idealised version of monetary institutions, in which
the value of money deﬂates at precisely the rate of time preferences. Such a monetary
policy is diﬃcult to implement, as it requires subsidising money holders, and doing
so at a knife-edge rate. Even slightly over-subsidising money leads to fundamental
non-existence problems (agents want to hold too much money, and the money market
does not clear). Therefore, we study the more realistic situation in which money is
under-subsidised, i.e. with inﬂation or less deﬂation than the Friedman rule.
In Theorem 3, we establish that away from the Friedman rule, agents’ decisions
follow ﬁnite money cycles that begin with no money holdings in every stationary
equilibrium. We show that money can only have value for money cycles of length
two or more. In a money cycle equilibrium, the distribution of money holdings is non-
trivial, with a ﬁnite support. In Theorem 4, we characterize the choices throughout
each cycle. First, agents front-load consumption in response to the inﬂation tax. We
interpret this as a hot potato eﬀect of inﬂation. Second, agents also attempt to back-
load production, but this is limited by the no-credit constraint and their preference
to front-load consumption. Third, money cycles begin with work in the ﬁrst period
and end with a vacation in the last period. In Corollary 5.3, we show that when
agents face a constant marginal production cost, money cycles have a monotonic
Baumol-Tobin structure with only one work day. However, we provide an example
with increasing marginal cost in which the money holdings are not monotonically
decreasing throughout the money cycle. Figure 2 shows an example of a simple
money cycle.
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Figure 2: A simple money cycle. The symbols q, z and x denote production, real
balances of money holdings, and consumption respectively. Consumption oscillates
around the eﬃcient level, x.
The Euler equation is important for characterizing the equilibrium.
Lemma 1. If x, x0, and z0 > 0 are optimal choices at some money balance z, then
then
u0 (x) =

1 + 
u0 (x0) : (10)
Proof. When z0 > 0, the agent can change today’s consumption x to x +  and
tomorrow’s consumption x0 to x0 (1+) without violating any no-credit constraints,
for  suﬃciently close to zero. The agent’s lifetime value changes by
[u(x+ )  u(x)] + [u(x0   (1 + ))  u(x0)]:
Since the agent rejects any such deviation,  = 0 maximises this value change, so the
ﬁrst-order condition (10) holds.
The ﬁrst-order condition
u0 (x) = c0 (q) (11)
applies on work days (when q > 0).
Deﬁnition 1. We say that an agent’s decisions (fqtg ; fxtg ; fztg) follow a money
cycle of length n > 0 if n is the smallest number such that zt = zt+n for all t. We
say that the money cycle is non-trivial if n > 1.
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Theorem 3. In every symmetric stationary monetary equilibrium away from the
Friedman rule (i.e. for 1+ > ), agents’ decisions follow a (possibly trivial) money
cycle that contains 0 money holdings. Every agent cycles through the same sequence.
Proof. Suppose (fqt g ; fxtg ; fzt g) is an optimal solution to the agents’ problem. We
argue below that fzt g includes 0 for some t. By truncating the start of the sequences,
we repeat the argument to conclude that zt includes a second 0. In a stationary
equilibrium, the same decisions are taken whenever zt = 0. We conclude that the
entire sequence of decisions between the ﬁrst and second time zt = 0 is repeated over
and over to form a money cycle. Since every agent’s sequence of money holdings zt
includes 0 and all agents follow the same policies in symmetric equilibria, it follows
that every agent follows the same sequence of decisions. Therefore, it suﬃces to show
that fzt g includes 0 for some t.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose that zt > 0 for all t. In this case, the Euler
equation (10) applies every period so that
u0 (x1) =

1 + 
u0 (x2) =    =


1 + 
t 1
u0 (xt ) : (12)
When the money growth rate is above the Friedman rule (i.e. 1 +  > ), the ﬁrst
term on the right side converges to 0, so u0 (xt )!1 and hence xt ! 0. Due to the
Inada condition, this implies u(xt ) !  1 and hence V (zt ) !  1. However V ()
is bounded below by the autarky payoﬀ of
max
x
1
1   [u(x)  c(x)] :
This contradiction implies that the premise that zt > 0 for all t is false.
Note that there may be multiple stationary equilibria. In this case, it would also
be an equilibrium for agents to switch from one money cycle to another. However,
such an equilibrium is not stationary.
The following corollary shows that a trivial money cycle (in which agents always
hold zero real-balances of money) can not be a monetary equilibrium. Rather, trivial
money cycles give rise to autarky.
Corollary 5.1. In every trivial money cycle equilibrium (with length one), money
has no value.
Proof. As shown above, every money cycle includes zero. This implies that each
agent’s real balance is zt = 0 in every period t. This means that the real value of the
money stock Mt is 0, which is only possible if money has no value (i.e. pt =1).
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Next, we show that the distribution of money holdings is non-degenerate, but
has a simple structure. This is because agents trade positions with each other in the
money cycle.
Corollary 5.2. In every symmetric stationary equilibrium, the distribution F of
(real balances of) money holdings has equal mass over a ﬁnite set.
Proof. The support of the distribution of real balances coincides with the equilibrium
sequence of real balances. Since each agent cycles through the sequence at the same
pace, the measure of agents at each point of the sequence is equal, so the stationary
distribution has equal mass at each point in its support.
Without loss of generality, we say that the start of the money cycle is when agents
hold no money. The following theorem summarizes the properties of money cycles.
Theorem 4. In every stationary equilibrium away from the Friedman rule (i.e.
1 +  > ), agents proceed through money cycles that
(i) have decreasing consumption, with marginal utility increasing in proportion to
the inﬂation tax, (1 + ) /.
(ii) the subsequence of non-zero production quantities is increasing throughout the
money cycle, with (shadow) marginal cost increasing in proportion to the in-
ﬂation tax.
(iii) begin with work and end with vacation.
Proof. (i) Previously, we found the Euler equation (10) holds between period t and
t+1 whenever zt+1 > 0. Since zt+1 is greater than 0 in every period before the
end of a money cycle, the Euler equation holds between every period within a
money cycle. The Euler equation implies consumption decreases with marginal
utility increasing in proportion to (1 + ) /.
(ii) Follows from part (i) and the production ﬁrst-order condition (11).
(iii) Since the agent begins a money cycle with no money, it must work to ﬁnance
its ﬁrst period consumption (which is the highest level of consumption in the
cycle by part (i) and hence can not be ﬁnanced by transfers).
Suppose the agent works in the last period. Since production is greater or equal
to consumption in the ﬁrst period, parts (i) and (ii) imply that production
is strictly greater than consumption in the last period. This contradicts the
conclusion that savings are 0 in the last period.
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The following corollary shows that when agents face a constant marginal pro-
duction cost, a Baumol-Tobin style work-vacation pattern such as the example in
Figure 2 emerges endogenously.
Corollary 5.3. If c (q) is aﬃne on (0;1), then money cycles contain only one work
day.
Proof. Since c0 (qt) = u0 (xt) on work days, and u0 (xt) increases over the money cycle,
it follows that c0 (qt) must increase on work days. But when c (q) is aﬃne, c0 (q) is a
constant.
However, if the marginal cost is strictly increasing, money cycles can become
more complex. We explore complex cycles in the next section.
Prescott et al. (2009) only study equilibria in which agents have access to perfect
credit markets. If agents only had access to money supplied away from the Friedman
rule, then we would expect money cycles would arise: consumption and work would
ﬂuctuate ineﬃciently due to the hot-potato eﬀect, and agents’ work weeks would be
too short. On the other hand, households often have access to other assets like retire-
ment plans, houses, and mortgages that have a higher return than money. Adjusting
ﬁnancial portfolios involve substantial overheads, so households would use money for
short-term smoothing and illiquid assets for long-term smoothing, as in Alvarez et al.
(2002) and Kaplan and Violante (2014). In this paper, we focus on a single overhead
at a time for simplicity. In future work, we think it would be interesting to combine
the two types of overheads to understand retirement and work-week allocations arise.
Simple money cycles also arise in Baumol (1952), Tobin (1956), and Menzio et al.
(2013). We illustrate the diﬀerences between these money cycles in the following
section.
6 Refuted Conjectures
In this section, we refute four natural conjectures.
Conjecture 1: Inﬂation depresses output and trade
Keynes (1923, p. 45–) suggested that the opposite ought to be true – that inﬂation
might stimulate trade because idle money loses value. Lucas (1996) discusses the con-
jecture thoroughly and points out that in standard micro-founded monetary models
it is true:5 the Friedman rule typically maximizes welfare, and inﬂation reduces pro-
5 Earlier in standard overlapping generations models, later in search models such as Lagos and
Wright (2005) and many others.
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duction, consumption, and trade. However, Lucas (1996) also cites many models that
suggest the opposite, but “any of these models leads to the distinction of anticipated
and unanticipated changes in money […] None of these models deduces the [oppo-
site of Conjecture 1] from assumptions on technology and preferences alone.” In our
model, this conjecture is true for many parameter values. For example in Figure 2,
aggregate consumption and production are below the Friedman rule level, x (see
Theorem 2). However, in Figure 3, inﬂation stimulates aggregate consumption and
production above the eﬃcient level. In this example, the ﬁxed cost is high, so that
q is very large compared to x, which means the agent would ideally work very
infrequently. However, inﬂation is also high, which in contrast makes the agent want
to have a short money cycle, i.e. work frequently. As a result, the agent works inef-
ﬁciently often, and because the marginal cost of production is still relatively low, he
doesn’t reduce his per-shift hours by much. Therefore, inﬂation stimulates aggregate
production above the eﬃcient level, and does so without any monetary surprises or
asymmetric information.
Note that stimulus is distinct from the hot-potato eﬀect. Ennis (2009) was moti-
vated to study the hot-potato eﬀect in order to ﬁnd a mechanism by which inﬂation
might stimulate output. In his model, the hot-potato eﬀect causes inﬂation to in-
crease the number of transactions, but also to reduce transaction sizes. He does not
establish whether the net eﬀect of inﬂation can ever stimulate aggregate output.
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Figure 3: A money cycle with over-production and over-consumption, with u(x) =
x0:3, c(q) = 0:15 + q1:3,  = 0:98 and  = 0:3. Average consumption is above the
eﬃcient level, x.
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Conjecture 2: Wealthier agents consume more and produce less
It is natural to expect if consumption and leisure are normal goods, then agents
holding more money would choose more of both. However, Theorem 3 establishes
that this is not true in any money cycle equilibrium: the poorest agents are those at
the start of the cycle without any money. Yet these agents consume the most, and
produce the least (other than those on vacation).
In most of the micro-founded monetary literature, the models are too simple to
address this conjecture because all agents hold the same amount of money. But in
other models with a non-trivial distribution of money, the conjecture holds true. In
Menzio et al. (2013), agents have a discrete choice of whether to be a buyer or seller,
which they can smooth out using lotteries.6 Since lotteries incur no overheads, the
value functions are concave, and the policy functions are monotonic. Therefore, this
conjecture can only fail in a model with overheads. It is therefore no surprise that
in other models with overheads, this conjecture also fails. In a model of overheads
in asset markets, Kaplan and Violante (2014, ﬁg 1) depict an equilibrium with non-
monotonic consumption.
Conjecture 3: Money cycles consist of a work spell followed by a vacation
spell
In Baumol-Tobin, agents are only active in the ﬁrst period of their cycle. It’s tempting
to conjecture that agents might work several times (due to increasing marginal cost)
until they can aﬀord a vacation at the end of their cycle. But Figure 4 shows that
much more complicated arrangements can be optimal. A single money cycle contains
two work spells and two vacation spells.
In Menzio et al. (2013), the agents follow a stochastic version of Baumol-Tobin
money cycle that satisﬁes the conjecture. Agents start their cycle with no money,
work once, and do not work again until they run out of money. When agents run low
on money, they play lotteries rather than working. If lotteries were unavailable, then
agents would fall back on using money to convexify their problem; we expect that
for some parameter values, they would work in multiple spells throughout the cycle.
Conjecture 4: Symmetric stationary equilibria always exist
In Theorem 3, we established that every symmetric stationary equilibrium is a money
cycle equilibrium. But is there always such an equilibrium? We provide a counter-
example. In the counter-example, there is no symmetric stationary equilibrium, but
6 The use of lotteries to convexify out the buy/sell choice was ﬁrst developed by Faig (2008).
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Figure 4: Equilibrium money cycle and related histogram of money holdings when
u (x) = x0:3, c (q) = 0:1 + q1:5,  = 0:98 and  = 0:01.
there is an asymmetric stationary equilibrium in which some agents follow one money
cycle, and the other agents follow a diﬀerent money cycle.
The counter-example is based on the setting in Figure 4. The preferences and
production technology are the same, but the inﬂation rate is now ﬁxed at  =
0:01445. To establish that there is no symmetric stationary equilibrium, we plot the
symmetric excess demand correspondence, and show that it jumps over the market
clearing point (0). In our model, the only endogenous price is the real value T of
the (nominal) monetary transfers that are used to implement the inﬂation rate .
As the value of transfers increases, agents can aﬀord to consume more and work less,
in which case excess demand would increase. In the counter-example depicted in
Figure 5, there is no market clearing value of T , so there is no symmetric stationary
equilibrium. However, there are asymmetric equilibria in this setting. At the jump
point T , the agents are indiﬀerent between two diﬀerent money cycle patterns – one
of which involves excess demand and the other which involves excess supply. The
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Figure 5: The symmetric excess demand correspondence jumps over the market-
clearing level when u (x) = x0:3, c (q) = 0:1 + q1:5,  = 0:98, and  = 0:01445.
excess demand and excess supply are of approximately equal magnitudes. If slightly
more than half of the population followed one money cycle, and the rest followed the
other, then markets would clear, forming an asymmetric equilibrium.7
Menzio et al. (2013) establish that a symmetric stationary equilibrium exists in
their economy when there is no inﬂation or deﬂation. In their economy, the policy
correspondences are single-valued and continuous, so jumps in the excess demand
correspondence of the kind of Figure 5 do not arise. If the agents did not have access
to perfectly fair lotteries, then we expect that only asymmetric stationary equilibria
would exist for some parameter values.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents one of the simplest models of money possible – there are no search
frictions, no overlapping generations, no cash-in-advance constraints, no nominal
rigidities – just a ﬁxed cost and a credit constraint. One might think it is hopeless to
learn anything from such a trivial model. But we drew several striking conclusions:
inﬂation has a “hot potato eﬀect” leading to front-loading of consumption and under-
production on work days; inﬂation can stimulate ineﬃciently high economic activity,
even in the absence of shocks or asymmetric information; there is a non-degenerate
distribution of money holdings; but wealthier agents do not necessarily consume more
and work less, even when consumption and leisure are normal goods.
7 We conjecture that there always exists a stationary equilibrium with at most two diﬀerent
money cycles being followed by all agents.
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Our goal with this model was not to provide a theory of monetary stimulus or
labour supply, but to understand better the key economic logic of money. Our model
contributes to understanding monetary institutions in two ways. First, the frictions
in more complex models are related to the simpler frictions in our model, and the
equilibrium responses to the complex frictions mirror those in our simpler cousin.
For example, the saving patterns in Kaplan and Violante (2014) mirror those in
Baumol (1952) and Tobin (1956), and our model suggests how these might change if
there were an increasing marginal cost of portfolio adjustment. Another example is
in understanding the role of lotteries in Menzio et al. (2013), which were introduced
as a technical device to obtain monotone policy functions. Our model suggests how
their equilibria would change if agents faced overheads in playing lotteries.
Second, if a surprising conclusion of a simple model is quantitatively implausible,
this suggests a course for future research: does the simple friction have a more realistic
cousin that has a similar eﬀect? For example, is there an overhead in some other
economic activity (for example, ﬁnancial portfolio adjustment) that leads inﬂation
to have a stimulus eﬀect?
A Appendix
A.1 Liquid Lucas Trees
For purposes of comparison, we adapt the model from Section 2 by replacing money
with deterministic Lucas trees that are in ﬁxed supply. We show that the analysis
above goes through with minor changes.
Suppose that instead of money, there is a forest of measure A of Lucas trees,
which has an aggregate yield of yA every period. The price of the consumption good
in time is pt, and a measure one forest trades for Rt units of consumption good in
time t. An agent with measure a of trees in time t has a value of
Wt (at) = max
qt2R+;xt2R+;at+12R+
u (xt)  c (qt) + W (at+1)
s.t. ptxt + ptRtat+1 = ptqt + pt(Rt + y)at:
(13)
We focus our attention on equilibria in which Rt = R is a constant. This leads to
the stationary Bellman equation,
W (a) = max
q2R+;x2R+;a02R+
u (x)  c (q) + W (a0)
s.t. x+Ra0 = q + (R + y)a:
(14)
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This Bellman equation can be reformulated to look like (2), by making the state
variable ~a = (R + y)a the value (measured in consumption units) of the forest a:
V (~a) = max
q2R+;x2R+;~a02R+
u (x)  c (q) + V (~a0)
s.t. x+ R
R + y
~a0 = q + ~a:
(15)
Unless the trees have no yield (i.e. y = 0), this is not an isomorphic representation,
because there is no equivalent transfer term T . Nevertheless, it is clear that the
theory from Section 5 generalises in a straight-forward way, as the transfers do not
play an important role in the proofs.
On the other hand, this reformulation is confusing for thinking about market
clearing conditions, so we deﬁne equilibrium in terms of the original formulation. Let
F be the measure of agents holding up to a units of forest. The stationary symmetric
equilibrium market clearing conditions are:Z
a0(a)dF (a) = AZ
x(a)dF (a) =
Z
q(a)dF (a) + Ay:
It is straightforward to show that the utilitarian social planner still prefers each
agent to consume x and work either q 2 f0; qg, as before. In other words, since
there is an exogenous endowment available in the economy, a smaller measure of
agents need to work to sustain the same amount of consumption.
If the trees have no yield (y = 0), then the economy is equivalent to a monetary
economy with no inﬂation or deﬂation ( = 0). If trees have a positive or negative
yield (y 6= 0), then the Lucas trees function like money with growth rate  = R/(R+
y)   1. In other words, positive yields are like deﬂation and negative yields are like
inﬂation.
We observe that the only property of the forest that matters is the aggregate
yield. That is, the equilibria do not change when the size of the forest doubles and
the yield of each tree halves, because agents can bundle two unproductive trees into
a single productive tree. Equilibria can only be eﬃcient if the aggregate yield is a
suﬃciently large “subsidy” to support a return equal to the rate of time-preference.
A.2 Algorithm
The usual approach to calculating dynamic equilibria is to exploit the contraction
property of Bellman operators to approximate the agent’s value function. However,
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the discrete choices make the value function non-concave, and therefore diﬃcult to
represent faithfully on a computer. Our approach is to try every possible sequence of
extensive margin choices, and to apply Theorem 4 to calculate the optimal choices on
the intensive margins, taking the extensive margins as ﬁxed. The main diﬃculty is
that, a priori, there might be an (uncountably) inﬁnite number of possible extensive
margin choices among all possible money cycles. We solve this problem with Theo-
rem 5, which establishes an upper bound on the length of a money cycle equilibrium
in a given economy, and hence a bound on the number of possible extensive margin
choices the agent has.
Theorem 5. Consider a money cycle equilibrium with inﬂation so that T > 0.
(i) If the agent holds real balances of z1, then
(a) their consumption x1 lies in [T; x1], where x1 = maxfz1 + T; x^g and x^
solves u0 (x) = c0 (x  z1   T ).
(b) they spend all of their money within the following number of periods,
log u
0 (x1)
u0 (T )

log 
1 + 

:
(ii) Since money cycles begin with z1 = 0, the length of money cycles is bounded by
this expression at z1 = 0.
Proof. (i) (a) Clearly x1  T . We need to show that x1  maxfz1 + T; x^g. If the
agent does not work in the ﬁrst period, then x1  z1 + T . If the agent
works, we will show that x1  x^. Intuitively, if an agent consumes a lot,
then they must also produce a lot; but as diminishing marginal utility
and increasing marginal cost set in, it becomes suboptimal to increase
consumption and production. Since the agent starts with z1 real balances
of money, the budget constraint implies that q1  x1   z1   T . The ﬁrst-
order conditions imply u0 (x1) = c0 (q1). Moreover, since marginal cost is
increasing, c0 (q1)  c0 (x1   z1   T ). Thus, u0 (x1)  c0 (x1   z1   T ), or
equivalently, x1  x^ since u0 is decreasing and c0 is increasing.
(b) Now suppose that z2; : : : ; zn > 0. We will put an upper bound on n for
which this can be true. Under inﬂation, xn  T > 0. By the Euler equa-
tion,
u0 (x1) =


1 + 
n
u0 (xn) :
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Substituting the bound for x1 above and the bound xn  T into this
equation gives
u0 [maxfz1 + T; x1g]  u0 (x1) =


1 + 
n
u0 (xn) 


1 + 
n
u0 (T ) ;
which can be rearranged to the bound on n given above.
(ii) Trivial.
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